Dimitri Alperovitch, co-founder and chairman of Silverado Policy Accelerator, kicked off the keynote addresses to a crowd of about 2,800 attendees at the annual HOU.SEC.CON conference with his expert analysis of the evolving security challenges within the Asia-Pacific region. An analysis that underscores the critical role cyberwarfare is very likely to play in any future conflict between China and the United States over Taiwan sovereignty.
Drawing upon lessons from the ongoing war in Ukraine and examining Chinese military preparations, Alperovitch’s analysis highlights an urgent need for the United States to enhance its cyber defenses and integrate cyber capabilities into its broader defense strategy.
Alperovitch, who studies emerging threats and recently authored World on the Brink: How America Can Beat China in the Race for the Twenty-First Century, compared the strategic rationales behind Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s stance towards Taiwan. In both cases, Alperovitch contends that long-standing historical narratives and a sense of unfinished national missions drive the leaders. These aspirations underpin the risk of conventional military operations—but the potential conflict over Taiwan is likely to be more complex due to advances in cyberwarfare and the digital interdependence of modern societies and militaries.
According to his analysis, Chinese preparations are not only visible in the buildup and modernization of conventional forces but also in significant cyber activities. Notably, Chinese-affiliated groups have gained persistent access to critical infrastructure in the United States and other countries in the western Pacific. These penetrations focus on water utilities, power grids, and port operations, aiming to allow potential disruption during a crisis.
Alperovitch said Chinese threat actors are not breaking in to steal secrets, government secrets, commercial secrets, or intellectual property. They're breaking into water utilities, electric utilities, other critical infrastructure, like port facilities, and they're maintaining persistent access within those networks. “They're breaking into networks where they have nothing valuable to steal. And they're not deploying malware, and they're not doing anything damaging, they're just keeping that access. And if they get kicked out, they try to re-engage and get back in again," Alperovitch said.
This evolution in strategy reflects a broader view of military operations, where cyber actions—such as disabling logistics or communications—could delay U.S. intervention or reduce its effectiveness in defending Taiwan. The analysis also notes visible physical clues to Chinese preparation, such as military infrastructure built to simulate Taiwanese urban layouts and the production of large numbers of ships suitable for large-scale amphibious operations.
Key Cybersecurity Lessons from Ukraine
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has served as a test case for modern cyber operations in warfare. While Russia invested heavily in cyber-attacks—such as deploying destructive wiper malware and targeting Ukrainian military and civilian networks—these efforts have been largely ineffective from a strategic standpoint. Alperovitch factors contributing to this included a lack of coordination with traditional military operations, unclear strategic goals for cyber teams, and a Ukrainian population unfazed by cyber disruptions in the face of continuous kinetic attacks.
"If they [Russian threat actors] thought that they could instill panic amongst the population. They failed entirely, in part because the population was experiencing kinetic attacks or missiles flying into their buildings, into their supermarkets, into their train stations. When you're under those types of attacks, worrying about cyber threats is not going to be at the top of your list."
Some attacks, such as the disruption of the ViaSat communications network and the breaching of key telecommunications firms, temporarily impacted Ukraine’s defenses but did not significantly change the course of the war.
The takeaway for U.S. planners is the limited effectiveness of isolated cyber-attacks when not closely integrated with a wider operational strategy.
Chinese Cyber Doctrine and Its Implications
Chinese cyber doctrine appears to be more systematic, with long-term objectives and attempts to establish pre-crisis access to critical systems, Alperovitch said. His analysis suggests that, in a Taiwan conflict, cyber operations would be at the forefront, aimed at slowing the U.S. military response, targeting military logistics systems, cloud-based sustainment platforms, naval communications, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. Disruption of civilian infrastructure, both in the United States and in allied countries such as Japan and the Philippines, is also a key concern.
Additionally, the Chinese strategy would likely include attempts to isolate Taiwan by cutting undersea cables, launching concentrated cyber-attacks on communications, and misinformation campaigns to demoralize the population and authorities, and targeting commercial shipping and port operations.
What the U.S. Must do to Prepare
Alperovitch’s analysis highlights several steps the United States should undertake to address these emerging threats:
1. Integration of Cyber Operations and Military Planning:
The U.S. Department of Defense should ensure that cyber capabilities are fully integrated into operational planning, training, and exercises to enhance overall effectiveness. Cyber teams need to coordinate in real-time with kinetic forces in any potential conflict, drawing on lessons from the shortcomings observed in Ukraine.
2. Hardening Critical Infrastructure:
Both military and civilian systems must be routinely tested and reinforced against cyber intrusion. Both military and civilian system owners should address vulnerabilities in logistics, sustainment, and communications networks, and create analog backups to implement where digital systems remain vulnerable. There is also value in pre-positioning secure communications equipment and ensuring redundancy for mission-critical systems.
3. Strengthening Public-Private Collaboration:
Because much critical infrastructure in the U.S.—such as ports and utilities—is privately owned, there must be robust cooperation between government agencies and the private sector. Regular information sharing, joint incident response exercises, and clear roles and responsibilities during a crisis are vital to national resilience.
4. Enhancing Allied Coordination:
Given the likelihood of cyberattacks targeting U.S. bases and operations in allied countries, shared defense protocols, joint cyber exercises, and integrated response plans with key allies, such as Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, are recommended.
5. Intelligence and Early Warning Systems:
The U.S. should continue investing in cyber intelligence and early warning capabilities, both to detect potential pre-crisis penetrations and to identify attacks in their early stages.
Alperovitch concluded that cyberwarfare is shaping up to be a potentially decisive element in any future Taiwan conflict, with significant implications for U.S. and allied preparation. The risk is not only to military systems but to the civilian infrastructure that underpins mobilization and sustained operations. Addressing these risks, by closing the gap between cyber and conventional forces and deepening public-private and international cooperation, is now considered a critical priority for U.S. defense planning.
